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STEREOTYPES AS CHANNELS AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “glass ceiling” is one of many metaphors we use to talk about 
systematic inequalities in particular workplaces, the labor force more 
generally, and the distribution of social goods along identity lines most 
broadly. It was first coined in 1986 to describe the phenomenon of an invisible 
barrier that women did not seem to be able to cross in their efforts to ascend to 
the highest positions in businesses and government.1 The focus of most 
research and discussion of the glass ceiling has glossed over important race-
based inequalities among women; more recently, the barrier that women of 
color face has been called the “concrete ceiling.”2 This shift in language is 
important not just to highlight disparities among women, but also to account 
for the realities of stalled progress and the debate about how to fix gender gaps. 
A glass ceiling can be shattered by a single woman with a hammer, but a 
concrete ceiling “‘need[s] a door and there need to be other people on the other 
side of that door’” to help a person through.3 
 
* Thanks to Claire Wiltse for inviting me to participate in this excellent symposium. This essay is 
an outgrowth of research that I have been doing for years connected with other projects, and 
many research assistants have helped along the way, including James Bertucci, D’Ann Bey, Anne 
Blake, John Bowen, Hayley Collins, Jesse Packard, Jillian Plescia, Jessica Scales, and Robert 
Zimmerman. The thoughts in this essay have also benefitted from discussions and workshops on 
these topics at the annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, the annual 
meeting at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and internal faculty workshops at the 
Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Carol Hymowitz & Timothy D. Schellhardt, The Glass Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem 
to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them from the Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986, 
at 1; see also ANN M. MORRISON ET AL., BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: CAN WOMEN REACH 
THE TOP OF AMERICA’S LARGEST CORPORATIONS? (1987) (studying women in Fortune 100 
companies). 
 2. Jo Piazza, Women of Color Hit a “Concrete Ceiling” in Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 
2016, at R9. In addition to the concrete ceiling, “bamboo ceiling” is a term coined specifically to 
describe the barriers to progress for people of Asian descent. JANE HYUN, BREAKING THE 
BAMBOO CEILING: CAREER STRATEGIES FOR ASIANS (2005). 
 3. Piazza, supra note 2 (quoting Annalisa Adams-Qualtiere, a leader in human resources 
departments for a number of large organizations). 
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This essay's focus will be on the ways that identity matters to advancement 
at work, particularly as it is tied to stereotyping and its connection with gender 
discrimination. I think we all have a sense about the meaning of these concepts 
– of what identity is, what stereotypes are, and how they might work to 
discriminate against some historically disempowered groups. And the law, 
because we create it, embodies those concepts. Title VII, for example, 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,4 and the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that at least some sex stereotyping, penalizing a woman for not 
fitting a stereotype, for example, can be a form of sex discrimination.5 
Despite that understanding and the legal recognition of the pernicious 
nature of stereotypes, as the other contributors to this symposium document, 
sex-based gaps in occupational categories, in level of achievement, in pay, and 
in wealth persist. The law, as it is, is not fixing what is broken. And part of the 
reason for the law's ineffectiveness is that much of what we think we know 
about identity, what stereotypes are, and how they operate is likely wrong, or 
at least not entirely accurate. Our common understanding does not accurately 
assess what social science has revealed to be true. As a result, the law as it is 
currently enforced does not do a very good job of getting at the cause of 
inequality. 
First, I have to make a disclaimer because I am a lawyer – and that actually 
is the disclaimer. I am a lawyer, not a psychologist, but most of what I am 
going to write about is psychological research about the human decision-
making process in a social context. So why am I talking about the science of 
decision-making, you might ask? Maybe this is really obvious, but it is because 
human decision-making in a social context is central to the way that paid work 
is distributed. In other words, some human's (or group of humans) choice is 
usually the gatekeeper to jobs. Understanding how those decisions get made is 
central to understanding what is causing them to be made in a way that 
contributes to continuing inequalities. 
This essay will explore the effects of stereotypes from two standpoints: 
their effects on the actions of the person making the decision, and their effects 
on the actions of people subject to the decision. Stereotypes influence 
cognitive processes in ways the decision-maker may not realize, and being a 
subject of stereotyping changes the performance of an actor in ways related 
and unrelated to the stereotype. Most of the literature on stereotypes is focused 
on only one of these. Looking at both helps us see some reasons why our 
current approach to anti-discrimination law, focused mostly on fully self-aware 
prejudice and putting the burden on the person subject to discrimination to 
recognize and challenge it, is not working to erase inequality and in fact has 
institutionalized it. 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 5. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
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II.  STEREOTYPES OF OUTSIDERS 
Most of us think of the core of identity as being something fairly fixed and 
innate6 – things people are born with that cannot or should not be changed. Our 
sense of identity is who we are and who we believe we have always been. 
While we might acknowledge that our identity has been shaped by 
experiences, to some extent, we mostly view that as reactive, with those 
experiences having happened to us in a way at least somewhat out of our 
control.7 The courts tend to adopt this view as well. We treat sex and race as 
part of this core. In the words of the Supreme Court, these are immutable 
characteristics with discrete boundaries.8 Those categories carry with them 
more than a simple label, although as discussed in Part III, even a simple label 
has powerful consequences. These categories have baggage. They bring with 
them a whole group of social meanings that many people believe link the 
identity characteristic with behaviors, feelings, and sometimes abilities. And 
we all get stuck with that baggage as a function of our interaction with each 
other. 
What I am describing is what stereotypes are and what effects they have, 
but most people do not think of all of that baggage as stereotyping – at least 
not the discriminatory kind of stereotyping. Most of us probably think of 
stereotypes as the “Archie Bunker” kind of stereotype, which embodies what 
we recognize as overt prejudice. Archie Bunker was a character in the 
groundbreaking television situation comedy “All in the Family,” a television 
series that ran through most of the 1970s.9 Archie, the father of the family, was 
a white blue-collar worker whose vocal prejudices were used to explore 
controversial issues like racism, sexism, gay rights, reproductive health, and 
the Vietnam War.10 
Prejudice like this often comes in the form of descriptive stereotypes, 
descriptions of what people are like, that are often negative and inaccurate. 
 
 6. Philosophers have been debating what identity is for centuries, and it is a somewhat 
problematic concept because our bodies change over time and defining the mind is difficult. See 
generally Eric T. Olson, Personal Identity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 20, 
2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/. 
 7. See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950) (describing identity 
formation as the effort by an individual to integrate experiences and characteristics into a stable 
sense of self). 
 8. See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting that “sex, like race 
and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth”); 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (contemplating searching 
review under the Fourteenth Amendment for “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities”). 
 9. All in the Family (CBS television broadcast Jan. 12, 1971–Apr. 8, 1979). 
 10. Id. 
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These are also tied to prescriptive stereotypes about what people should be 
like. So a stereotype that women cannot stand up to men or should defer to 
men or that women cannot do the physically demanding and dangerous work 
of firefighters and should not want to do the physically demanding and 
dangerous work of firefighters is clearly discrimination. And when many 
people think about stereotypes as discrimination, it is this kind of thing they 
imagine: a supervisor who is a throwback to an earlier era, skeptical that 
women can be good engineers, for example, and so not taking seriously 
women who apply for an engineering position. We think that stereotypes are 
these explicit prejudices and that they operate as part of people's conscious 
decision-making processes, so that if you asked that supervisor why he did not 
look at women candidates and he was honest about it, he would say that it was 
because he did not think that woman could be good engineers. 
That kind of stereotyping does exist, and this kind of discrimination 
happens more than we like to think still.11 But that is really just the tip of the 
iceberg about what stereotypes are and how they influence human behavior. 
Stereotypes are not always part of our fully conscious decision-making 
process, but they still shape what we believe, what we think, and what we do. 
Part of the way that our brains work to navigate the world is by creating 
categories (or schema) for things that operate as cognitive shortcuts.12 
According to cognitive psychology research, this process is hard wired into our 
brains.13 The things in our world vary incredibly, and if we had to start from 
scratch to understand the properties of each variation we encountered, we 
would not be able to act.14 So to function, we generalize about things – objects 
and people both – based on a few encounters with them, use those 
generalizations to define categories, and in the future, quickly sort new things 
into those categories without reflection.15 You can imagine why this is useful 
with a concrete example. I do not have to think about whether this particular 
round firm object is edible if it has the characteristics of the category in my 
mind called “apple.” And if I have two round, firm, hand-sized objects, but one 
has fuzz on the outside, and rebounds slightly when I grip it, I know not to take 
a bite out of it because it is a tennis ball, not an apple. So we use the definitions 
 
 11. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in 
the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J 1 (2005). 
 12. See JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA 
THEORY 1–10 (1984). 
 13. See id. (describing the process of categorization schemas as automatic). 
 14. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977) (“Since no organism can cope with infinite 
diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment 
into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as equivalent.”). 
 15. Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 
28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978). 
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of our categories to define the thing we have encountered and to predict how 
that thing is likely to act or what we can do with it.16 This sorting function lets 
us make quick judgments, makes the world seem more predictable, and allows 
us to act. 
Although this process is important to our ability to function, relying on 
categories for quick thinking – in other words, creating group identities – has 
deep consequences. Assigning an object to a group makes us see that object 
more like other things within that group and less like things outside of that 
group.17 This process works the same way when people are given group 
identities. Even when the distinction we make is arbitrary, for example where 
people are randomly assigned to teams, those people view members of their 
own group (the in-group) as more like themselves, and others (the out-group) 
as more different from them than if the others had no group identity.18 We not 
only assign other people to groups; we assign or identify ourselves as part 
groups as well, and that process has similarly important consequences. People 
who identify as part of a group are also far less able to see differences among 
members of the out-group even when they have identical information about 
individuals in the out-group and individuals in the in-group.19 
 
 16. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188–89 (1995). 
 17. See Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956) (finding that when nonsense syllables were linked 
to a spot on a spatial continuum, participants tended to judge syllables linked to another spot as 
more different from the first than if no syllables had been linked to any spot); Krieger, supra note 
16, at 1186 n.103 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification 
and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963) (when lines were grouped, 
participants judged their comparative length as more similar when they compared lines within the 
same group and more different when compared to one in the other group than the same people did 
when they compared the length of lines not assigned to any group) and Henri Tajfel, Cognitive 
Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969) (describing the above experiment in 
more detail)). 
 18. Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination, 
in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 58, 61 (David M. 
Messick & Ann E. Tennbrunsel eds., 1996); Ann Locksley et al., Social Categorization and 
Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup -Discrimination Effect, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83 (1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a 
Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING 
AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981). 
 19. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the 
Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F. Dovidio & 
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). Many studies that support this point are summarized in Patricia 
W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An 
Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM, 
supra at 165, 168–73. Some of these studies asked members of student groups to rate the 
similarity of members of their own and other groups and to assess the traits of members of their 
own and different groups, asking people to assess how likely someone in their group would fit a 
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As you can probably predict from this description, one consequence of 
these cognitive structures is the tendency to stereotype, but the stereotype I am 
describing does not sound like the prejudice used as part of conscious 
processing that we all recognize as discriminatory. Stereotypes are more 
powerful than that. They are cognitive shortcuts – part of the process of 
perceiving, processing, and remembering information – that link personal traits 
with salient characteristics to simplify thinking.20 Once set, these cognitive 
shortcuts “bias[] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, 
retention, and recall of information about other people,” and they influence 
judgment continuously.21 These cognitive shortcuts create expectations that 
actually change how we perceive others, remember things about others, and 
interpret motivations for the actions of others.22 We tend to remember the 
things a person actually did only if those actions fit our stereotypes of that 
person; we tend to believe we remember a person doing things consistent with 
the stereotypes even if the person never did them; and we tend to forget the 
things that did not conform to those stereotypes.23 Additionally, we tend to 
assume that a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted because of 
innate characteristics – they are this type of person, so they will usually act this 
way – but a person who acts inconsistently with a stereotype acted because of 
transitional or situational factors – that they are not this type of person and so 
will not usually act this way.24 
Groups or categories are created by our choice of what characteristics 
matter – which are salient.25 Once a characteristic, such as gender or race, 
becomes salient to a person, that characteristic defines a group.26 But what 
becomes salient is neither inevitable nor natural. Individuals define what is 
salient in any given context. Thus at some point, individuals choose what 
makes something a group and who will belong in those groups, although that 
 
stereotype and how likely someone outside of their group would, and asking people with a 
particular opinion to rate the similarity of people with the same or a different opinion. Id. 
 20. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of 
Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–22 (2000). This description of 
stereotypes may sound harmless, but in a society like ours with persistent gaps and inequalities, 
stereotypes may perpetuate and even aggravate those gaps. 
 21. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1188. 
 22. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1200–09. 
 23. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1207–09 (summarizing research on stereotypes and memory); 
see also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977). 
 24. Krieger, supra note 16, at 1204–07. 
 25. See Krieger, supra note 16, at 1190. 
 26. See Krieger, supra note 16, at 1190. 
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choice may not be one taken after reflection, but instead may be something 
learned from others in society.27 
Let me give a description of how stereotypes operate in this way.28 
Imagine that you work in an office that starts with a group meeting every 
morning at 9 AM. Today, two people, both in their early thirties, were late: 
Donna and Jim. Why was Donna late—what do you think the boss and maybe 
their coworkers will assume? Getting the kids out the door and to daycare or 
school must have been a challenge this morning. You might notice that Donna 
looks a little tired. That is probably because her kids kept her up. Maybe one 
has been sick. She is having a hard time juggling it all. And she is going to 
keep having a hard time because she is going to keep juggling. So is Donna 
likely to have a chronic problem of not prioritizing work? 
Why was Jim late? Who thinks it is because he had a hard time getting the 
kids out the door and to daycare or school? We are likely to attribute Jim's 
lateness to traffic, something out of his control. If Jim looks tired is it more 
likely because of caregiving or because he has been working too hard? And if 
we assume traffic made Jim late and he has been working hard, is Jim likely to 
have a chronic problem of not prioritizing work? 
The way this plays out is that the person calling the meeting is likely to 
interpret the exact same conduct differently depending on whether it was done 
by a woman or a man. That person may “remember” Donna's lateness even if 
she is almost never late, and may not remember Jim ever being late before 
even if he has been. Donna's lateness is more likely to be attributed to her 
choices and as part of who she is – as a woman, she is assumed to put her 
family before her job. And Jim is assumed to put his job before his family – or 
as supporting his family through his devotion to work – and as persistently 
making that choice. I hope you can see how the effects of these cognitive 
shortcuts can lead to real job consequences for both men and women. Is now 
the right time for Donna to get a promotion if we assume she is juggling work 
and family? Doesn't Jim seem the more natural choice? 
 
 27. See, e.g., H.J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973) 
(“Stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of society. They are 
transmitted across generations as a component of the accumulated knowledge of society.”); David 
L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979) (describing how 
behaviors get attributed to groups); Richard Nisbett & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Systems of 
Thought, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 291–92 (2001) (describing their review of the literature on 
how societies differ in systems of thought and drawing conclusions about how those differences 
influence cognitive processes). 
 28. This example is adopted from Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: 
Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” 
Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003). 
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The challenge here is that well-intentioned people have cognitive shortcuts 
that cause them to interpret information differently depending on the identity 
of the person acting.29 And especially because most people are well-
intentioned and believe they are not consciously using different standards, they 
might be more resistant to recognize that their decisions might be flawed.30 Yet 
study after study shows how well-meaning people discriminate on the basis of 
sex and race in making employment decisions. 
And these externally directed decisions are not the only kind that have 
effects on the workplace. Stereotypes also have important effects on the 
actions of people who are stereotyped. The next section explores those effects. 
III.  STEREOTYPES INTERNALLY 
Stereotypes are even more pernicious than the prior section described. 
They do not just affect people making decisions about other people; they affect 
how people themselves perform in different contexts.31 In other words, 
cognitive biases affect how I perceive others, but stereotypes can also affect 
how I behave in ways that are difficult for me to control. This phenomenon is 
known as “stereotype threat.” This label is imperfect because it suggests that a 
person’s performance is affected because he or she is afraid it will fulfill a 
stereotype,32 which in turn could suggest that the solution is for that person 
simply to ignore the stereotype and conquer the fear.33 The label thus implies 
that the performance effects are caused by fully self-aware choices. But like 
with cognitive biases, this is not the case. I will illustrate by describing some 
 
 29. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN 
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013). 
 30. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (“[T]he human mind defends itself against the 
discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that 
conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right.”); id. at 331-36. 
 31. See generally Sandra Lipsitz Bem, Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex 
Typing, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 354 (1981) (describing how children learn to define themselves and 
learn to evaluate their adequacy as people by gender schema). 
 32. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995). The 
conclusions that are drawn from this study by the authors and others who rely on it as they relate 
to cognitive performance are somewhat controversial because of the methodology used in the 
study. See, e.g., Paul R. Sackett et al., On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for 
African American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 7 (2004); Lee Jussim, 
Is Stereotype Threat Overcooked, Overstated, and Oversold?, HETERODOX ACAD. (Dec. 30, 
2015), http://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/12/30/is-stereotype-threat-overcooked-overstated-and-
oversold/. 
 33. See CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI 46 (2010) (describing how an “observer’s 
perspective” on the cause of underperformance of stereotyped groups leads to conclusions that the 
cause is some character or willpower deficiency in the person stereotyped). 
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studies that show how stereotypes affect performance in ways difficult to 
control. 
Many of these studies have been conducted in the context of race, but 
some have also been specifically focused on sex. I want to talk mostly about a 
couple of race studies, though, because the results are so powerful. You may 
be familiar with studies that show African Americans tend to get lower scores 
than white people on some standardized tests like the SAT.34 And women tend 
to get lower scores than men on the math portion of the SAT.35 What you may 
not know is that both groups perform differently if they are told something 
different about what the test is measuring.36 
You may also only know about stereotype threat studies affecting 
historically disadvantaged groups – which tend to give the impression that it is 
an issue only for those groups and not for white people when it comes to race 
or men when it comes to sex. But this phenomenon works the same way for 
majorities, also. My favorite illustration is a set of studies involving white and 
black subjects and miniature golf.37 These studies looked at two different 
stereotypes, one that was about black people performing more poorly, and one 
that was about white people performing more poorly.38 The study actually 
found stereotype threat affected both white and black subjects.39 
Two groups of golfers, one white and one black, were told before they 
began golfing, that the experiment they were a part of was testing the 
analytical skills of the participants.40 A control group of each was not told the 
purpose of the experiment.41 The white golfers did significantly better than the 
black golfers in the experimental group.42 And the black golfers in the control 
group did significantly better than the black golfers in the experimental 
 
 34. See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips eds., 1998). 
 35. See Hannah-Hanh D. Nguyen & Ann Marie Ryan, Does Stereotype Threat Affect Test 
Performance of Minorities and Women? A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Evidence, 93 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325–26 (2008). 
 36. Nguyen & Ryan, supra note 35, at 1315, 1316 tbl.2, 1325, 1328; Steele & Aronson, 
supra note 32, at 798, 808-10; see also Steven J. Spencer, et al., Stereotype Threat and Women’s 
Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 4 (1999) (showing that women 
performed better on difficult math tests when they were told that the tests had been proven not to 
have disparate gender performance compared to the control group which was not told the same 
thing about the test). 
 37. The studies are reported in Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and 
White Athletic Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.1213 (1999). 
 38. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1215–16. 
 39. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1219, 1223–24. 
 40. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216. 
 41. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216. 
 42. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tbl.1. 
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group.43 The second set of experimental groups, again, one white and one 
black, were told that the experiment was measuring natural athletic ability.44 In 
this experimental group, the black students outperformed the white students, 
and the white students in the experimental group performed significantly worse 
than the white students in the control group.45 For both groups, being told that 
the test would measure something that was a negative stereotype resulted in 
substantially lower performance, and for both groups, being told that the test 
would measure something that was a positive stereotype resulted in better 
performance. 
This is one set of important studies about the specific role of stereotypes 
linked with specific traits, and there are others that suggest that negative 
stereotypes can also influence performance more broadly. For example, in the 
educational context, African American students tend to underperform 
academically; they have poorer grades and other academic outcomes than 
white students with the same SAT scores.46 And at least sometimes, stigma 
that embodies a number of negative stereotypes has effects on tasks unrelated 
to any particular stereotype. So, for example, members of socially 
disadvantaged groups who believe their identity is secret perform puzzle-
solving tasks more effectively than members of socially disadvantaged groups 
who believe their identity is known to the person evaluating that 
performance.47 So stereotypes can have effects on behavior linked to them and 
effects on behavior not linked with them. 
Thus, stereotyping affects not just how people make decisions about 
others, it also affects how those subject to decisions perform. The cumulative 
effect of both sides of this equation has significant implications for anti-
discrimination law. The next section explores the law's ability to address them. 
IV.  ACCOUNTING FOR STEREOTYPES IN LAW 
Now that we have an idea of the cumulative effect of stereotypes and how 
they might impact the workplace, what do we do with this? One answer is for 
 
 43. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tb1.1. 
 44. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1216. A second experiment designed to delve more deeply 
into the effect of stereotypes on white people focused solely on white people and athletic ability. 
Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1219–21. 
 45. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1217 tbl.1. In the study of only white test takers, the white 
test takers in the group were told that the test measured hand-eye coordination performed 
substantially worse than the control group who were told that the test measured general sports 
performance. Stone et al., supra note 37, at 1221–22. 
 46. See STEELE, supra note 33, at 19–20. 
 47. See, e.g., Karla Hoff & Priyanka Panday, Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable 
Inequalities, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 206 (2006). 
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the law to provide some correction, usually in the form of some penalty.48 This 
is more challenging than it might first appear. Scholars and advocates have 
been pushing courts to incorporate this science of human decision-making into 
the definition of what discrimination is since at least the late 1990’s,49 and 
some judges have accepted that.50 So far, the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
done so, and in fact has rejected its relevance in many discrimination cases 
from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins – which was the first case to recognize sex 
stereotyping as discrimination and where the Court mostly ignored the expert 
evidence, and focused on the most clearly prejudiced statements as sufficient 
to prove sex discrimination51 – to the Court's most recent discussion in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes – which rejected a version of the implicit bias 
research as relevant to whether the culture of Wal-Mart produced sex 
discrimination in promotions and pay.52 
Our legal model of discrimination defines what is unlawful in an extremely 
narrow way, a way that does not actually reflect how people behave. Anti-
discrimination law penalizes acts that are otherwise perfectly legal if those acts 
are done because the actor was motivated by one limited aspect of the identity 
of the injured party.53 Let me be more concrete, using employment law as an 
 
 48. Not everyone agrees that the kind of discrimination that is not the fully self-aware 
prejudice type of stereotype should be penalized by law. See, e.g., Amy Wax, Discrimination as 
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130–34 (1999) (arguing that there should be no remedy for the kind 
of discrimination that is caused by implicit bias). But others point out that not every legal wrong 
requires motive as the state of mind. Marc Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous 
Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (analogizing liability for 
discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions on land); 
Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 
74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1234 (1999). 
 49. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 16. 
 50. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (implying that 
“subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” were a problem that disparate impact discrimination 
could reach); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
stereotypes as a form of cognitive bias and discrimination); Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling 
the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir 
Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 
151–52 (2010) (recognizing the power of implicit biases and their role in decision-making, but 
limiting employment discrimination prohibitions to conscious bias). 
 51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255–56 (1989) (holding that sex 
stereotyping played a role in the employer’s decision, but finding that the expert evidence of how 
stereotypes infect thinking in not fully self-conscious ways was unnecessary because enough 
comments showed explicit bias). 
 52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011). 
 53. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609–10 (1993); see Personnel Adm’r of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979) (holding that disparate treatment under the 
Fourteenth Amendment required discriminatory purpose, which was “more than intent as volition 
or intent as awareness of consequences”). 
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example of what is true in a variety of contexts. It is perfectly lawful to fire a 
person for a good reason, no reason, a stupid reason, or even a morally bad 
reason.54 Under federal law, there are only a few bad reasons that will turn that 
lawful act into an unlawful one, and even only a few identity characteristics 
that will do so: race, sex, national origin, religion, color,55 age,56 disability 
unimportant to the particular work at issue,57 genetic makeup,58 and 
membership in the military.59 
And we give defendants the benefit of every doubt for a number of 
reasons. Some are formal and built into the system, like the normal structures 
of liability, which provide that plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their 
allegations.60 There are also informal structures too, and one of the most 
powerful is the way most of us conceive the world. Many Americans embrace 
the just world theory as a core belief. The just world theory posits that good 
people are rewarded and bad people are penalized, and vice versa; if a person 
is rewarded it was because that person did something good, and if someone is 
penalized, that person must have done something bad to cause the penalty.61 
This ideal is woven into the American fabric in the form of the American 
Dream: that hard work and perseverance will lead to well-being and 
prosperity.62 When something bad happens to a person, like that they do not 
get a job or a promotion or are disciplined or fired, our strongest instinct is to 
believe the person did something wrong to cause such a thing unless the 
context clearly suggests otherwise. 
Relatedly, the concept of discrimination, especially for race, but to some 
extent for sex, too, is abhorrent for many white people.63 It brings up mental 
pictures of the Holocaust, firehoses and dogs trained on school children, and 
 
 54. See Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2015). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-2 (2012). 
 59. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311-19 (2012). 
 60. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513–20 (1993) (discussing the importance 
of keeping the burden of proof on the plaintiff in a discrimination case). 
 61. See generally MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL 
DELUSION (1980) (positing the just world theory as a description of the way people find meaning 
in their experiences). 
 62. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics, 
121 Q. J. ECON. 699, 699–702 (2006). 
 63. I single out white people here purposefully. White people and people of color tend to 
define racism differently, with white people defining it as an internal affective state, like fully 
self-aware prejudice, and people of color seeing racism in the effects of systems and institutions. 
See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 8, 11–12 (2d ed. 2006); see also 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., ON VIEWS OF RACE AND INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE 
WORLDS APART 11 (2016). 
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black men hung from trees. You can imagine the power of that aversion being 
multiplied and personalized when an outsider is asked to evaluate a decision 
made by someone else. If the evaluator identifies with the person in power, 
something it is more likely for white people and men to do,64 the evaluator will 
have an incentive to deny that race or sex had anything to do with the 
decision.65 To admit the possibility of discrimination in a situation where I 
identify with the decision-maker is to admit that I might discriminate, which is 
morally wrong and which I cannot admit to myself even that I would ever do. 
So white people, at least, tend to assume that decisions in the workplace are 
not made discriminatorily unless there is fairly strong evidence to suggest 
otherwise.66 
The combination of these core values works to place an extra thumb on the 
scale for defendants. First, if a bad thing happened to an employee, it is easier 
to think that something the employee did wrong caused that bad thing to 
happen. Second, it is easier to think that even if the employee did nothing 
wrong, at the very least, the defendant was motivated by something other than 
the race, sex, or other specially protected identity characteristic of the 
employee. For some identity characteristics – particularly race, color, and 
national origin, but sometimes also sex, religion, and age – the common 
approach is to assume a person would never do that because it is so morally 
 
 64. See DANIEL BYRD & BRUCE MIRKEN, POST-RACIAL? AMERICANS AND RACE IN THE 
AGE OF OBAMA 16-18 (2011), available at http://greenlining.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ 
AmericansandRaceinAgeofObama.pdf (describing how racial resentment and the belief that hard 
work leads to success causes more white people to believe that institutions treat black people the 
same as or better than white people); see also Pat Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-
Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 
(2009) (reporting on empirical study showing that white judges ruled differently on racial 
harassment cases than black judges did, regardless of political affiliation); Jennifer L. Peresie, 
Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (reporting on empirical study that showed that plaintiffs in 
sex discrimination cases were twice as likely to prevail if a woman was on the appellate panel); 
Renée Nicole Souris, The Impact of Panel Composition on Sex Discrimination Case Outcomes at 
the U.S. Circuit Courts 6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/Panel-Composition-on-Sex-Discrimination-
Case-Outcomes-2.pdf (citing some support that gender shapes judges’ attitudes and influences 
case outcomes). 
 65. See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 323, 331–36 (explaining how people who agree that 
racism is morally wrong will repress, deny, and sublimate to avoid acknowledging that their 
actions or views are racist). 
 66. A wonderful example of this is Justice Scalia’s statement in Walmart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes that, “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation – and surely most 
managers in a corporation that forbids . . . discrimination – would select []neutral, performance-
based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all” even if some 
managers would take actions that cause disparate impacts and others would engage in disparate 
treatment. 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011). 
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wrong. A person would only do that if they have a character defect, and that 
character defect would always be on display. 
There are even a number of analytical heuristics deployed in employment 
discrimination cases that embody these widely shared assumptions. The stray 
remarks doctrine discounts the probative effect of explicitly discriminatory 
statements, for example, providing that unless a biased statement is explicitly 
linked to the employment decision at issue, it is, at the very least, not direct 
evidence of discrimination, and may not be probative at all.67 A similar 
heuristic is the same decision-maker defense; if the person who makes a 
negative employment decision made a positive employment decision for the 
plaintiff before, the court assumes that discrimination cannot be the motive for 
the negative decision because a discriminator would never make a positive 
decision.68 Finally, courts tend to infer that intra-group discrimination is 
unlikely, at best, so that a female supervisor will not discriminate against 
women on the basis of sex,69 and that if even one member of the employee's 
group is treated well, then the employer did not discriminate in this instance.70 
Given the multiple thumbs on the scales in favor of defendants, the law 
seems particularly ill-suited to remedy decisions driven by stereotyped 
thinking. And because the law – at least the lawsuit as a tool to coerce 
wrongdoers to remedy injuries they cause – is focused on changing the conduct 
of wrongdoers who harm others, it seems even more ill-suited to provide a 
remedy for the way that stereotypes operate to channel a stereotyped person's 
behavior. 
There is one legal remedy in the antidiscrimination law toolbox that may 
be suited to this task: the prohibition on employment practices that cause 
disparate impacts on protected groups without a sufficiently necessary business 
justification for using those practices. In addition to prohibiting “intentional” 
discrimination, Title VII prohibits employment decisions that have 
discriminatory effects without considering the employer's motives.71 In other 
 
 67. Nancy J. Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE J. ONLINE 109, 118–21 (2012); Kerri Lynn 
Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (2012). 
 68. See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991) (laying out the economically grounded 
argument that discrimination is based on tastes and assuming those tastes are persistent); Kerri 
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 126–31 
(2011). 
 69. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) (recognizing the 
possibility that same-sex harassment would violate Title VII, but listing forms of evidence that 
were mostly linked to inter-group comparisons). 
 70. See generally Suzanne B. Goldgberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 
(2011). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
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words, criteria that do not explicitly include sex or race, but which negatively 
impact men of color or women of all colors are also barred unless those 
practices are job related and consistent with a business necessity.72 
Employers have always had the motivation to predict employee value with 
information about the potential employee that was easy to get at little cost, and 
they used protected classes as proxies for ability in particular fields until 
federal law prohibited that.73 Thus, once explicit consideration of race and sex 
was prohibited, employers shifted to other proxies for abilities, like educational 
credentials or standardized tests, but those proxies were not always good 
predictors and their use frequently weeded out or devalued women and all 
people of color.74 As noted above, at least partly because of the effects of 
being stereotyped, acquisition of credentials and performance on standardized 
ability tests can mean historically underrepresented groups look less 
qualified.75 This sounds like it is a tailor-made remedy to offset the effects 
stereotypes have on those stereotyped, but there are at least two problems with 
using disparate impact. First, not all discriminatory effects can be remedied, 
only those that cannot be demonstrated to be sufficiently job related.76 Second, 
because intentional discrimination is the model for what counts as 
discrimination, courts and at least some members of the public, are hostile to 
the idea that these kinds of cases should be allowed to be brought.77 
The Supreme Court, Congress, and the EEOC together have tailored the 
disparate impact doctrine to balance the negative effects of using credentials or 
tests against employers’ business interests.78 An employer can use a credential 
or test that disparately affects a protected group if the credential or test predicts 
 
 72. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. 
 73. E.g. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (explaining that the goal of the 
ADEA was to prohibit discrimination not based on animus, but on stereotypes of older people as 
less productive); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (holding that sex 
cannot be used as a proxy for longevity for purposes of pension benefits); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
424 (describing employer’s historical practice of segregating black employees into lowest paying 
jobs and replacement of that system with a high school diploma requirement and the use of 
intelligence tests for higher paying positions). 
 74. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–32 (1977) (rejecting height and weight 
requirements which were used as a proxy for strength that screened out a much larger proportion 
of women than men because such requirements were better assessed by testing strength directly). 
 75. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-
31; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. 
 76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
 77. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577 (stating “[a]s enacted in 1964, Title VII’s principal 
nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment. That section 
retains its original wording today” and ignoring the original statutory text prohibiting actions that 
had discriminatory effects). 
 78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h), (k); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (2016); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 451–52 (1976); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
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success in the position it is used for.79 For professionally developed tests, the 
test must be valid for its use; it must accurately measure or predict what it is 
supposed to measure or predict.80 In addition, an employer must first do an 
analysis of the job in question to decide what skills or attributes a person 
needs.81 But if that has been done, evidence that the test was carefully designed 
may satisfy the need to demonstrate its validity.82 This is often not a very 
demanding standard. 
And the current hostility to disparate impact is serious. The best example 
of that hostility is the Supreme Court's decision in 2009 in Ricci v. DeStefano, 
where the Court held that a city's decision to throw out the results of a 
promotional test because of the serious racial impact the test had was actually 
discrimination against white applicants.83 The Court denigrated the validity of 
the disparate impact remedy, stating “[a]s enacted in 1964, Title VII's principal 
nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment. 
That section retains its original wording today.”84 In making that assertion, the 
Court cited to the first paragraph of prohibited employment practices, which 
prohibits “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharge[ing] any individual, or 
otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”85 The Court ignored 
 
 79. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
 80. Id. The EEOC guidelines provide that the American Psychological Association’s 
generally accepted professional standards govern a validity analysis, at least for standardized 
tests, and that criterion-related, construct, or content validity studies will suffice. 29 C.F.R. §§ 
1607.5(B), (C). The EEOC defines these concepts this way: 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a criterion-related 
validity study should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure 
is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance . . . 
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a content validity study 
should consist of data showing that the content of the selection procedure is representative 
of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be 
evaluated . . . Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure through a 
construct validity study should consist of data showing that the procedure measures the 
degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which have been determined 
to be important in successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be 
evaluated. 
Id. § 1607.5(B). 
 81. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 429–36; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 82. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592–93 (holding that because the tests at issue were carefully 
created, they were valid enough that the employer lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it 
might lose a disparate impact case). 
 83. See id. at 579–92 (assuming that avoiding disparate impact liability would be disparate 
treatment and finding no strong basis in evidence that the city would be liable for the disparate 
impact its test caused). 
 84. Id. at 577. 
 85. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)). 
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the next paragraph of the original statutory text that prohibited actions that 
“would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” language that clearly 
reaches discriminatory effects.86 In addition to the majority's dismissal of the 
validity of the disparate impact cause of action, Justice Scalia, in a separate 
concurrence, argued that prohibiting disparate impact discrimination violated 
the Equal Protection clause because it required employers to consider the race 
and sex of employees and applicants in evaluating employment standards.87 
Although Justice Scalia's concerns about disparate impact have not been 
mentioned by any other Justices, the hostility to disparate impact seems clear. 
In the next Supreme Court case to involve disparate impact in the employment 
context, the Court failed to even address the disparate impact claim.88 Since 
then, the Court did recognize the viability of disparate impact under the Fair 
Housing Act, so the doctrine is not completely moribund.89 It still is 
endangered, though. The Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
dissented, all essentially arguing that disparate impact was not real 
discrimination and penalizing it was bad policy.90 Given the Republican sweep 
of the recent presidential and congressional elections and the appointment of 
conservative judge Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, it is likely that the 
conservative view of disparate impact will become the majority relatively 
soon. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Because the law as it is applied seems to fall short of correcting for the 
effect of stereotyping, something more fundamental needs to happen. One 
possibility is an amendment of Title VII to explicitly define discrimination to 
incorporate how stereotypes actually work, in connection with greater support 
for legal interventions to remedy harmful effects. And we need greater 
willingness to accept that the way we've ordered our society is not neutral. 
One last issue in connection with identity is important to discuss, and that 
is what identity characteristics really are. In this essay, I have focused mainly 
on sex and a little bit on race, and though there are differences, there are a lot 
of similarities to those identity statuses. We resort to the same main ways to 
describe these identities: genes, biological or phenotypical generalities, and 
 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)). 
 87. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 88. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 89. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 
(2015). 
 90. Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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finally, cultural constructs. For race, the scientific community has reached a 
fairly broad consensus that there is as much genetic and biological diversity 
within so-called racial groups and maybe more, as there is between them. Race 
is pretty clearly a social construct, but it is one with sticking power and real 
world effects. Sex is more strongly linked to genetics and biological and 
phenotypical generalities, but there is much more variation among humans 
than our culture tends to recognize. Much of what we think of as sex turns out 
to be socially constructed, just as for race. 
And this highlights the stereotype dilemma well. Stereotypes have 
“external” effects that injure us when other people make decisions about us, 
and they have “internal” effects, when we do not perform as well as we could 
on tasks our group is stereotypically bad at and maybe even other tasks there is 
no specific stereotype for. Similarly, identity is a complicated negotiation 
between the individual and society. To some extent, society or some outsider is 
the labeler of race or sex, and to some extent, individuals can self-label. 
External and internal labels interact to influence how others treat us and how 
we behave. We can choose to perform our identities in ways that meet 
expectations about those identities sometimes and to defy expectations other 
times. That may not always feel like a choice, and the performance is not 
always accepted as possible (or passible) by others. In other words, while I 
may have some control over the race or sex I identify as, I cannot completely 
control the race or sex others see me as having, and that label and the public 
attitudes towards that identity shape my behavior and performance of all kinds 
of tasks, not just performance of identity. 
This interplay of society and the individual sounds exactly like the social 
model of disability, which the disability rights movement used successfully to 
advocate for greater access and structural change in a civil rights context. The 
key insight of the social model of disability is that while an impairment can be 
defined as existing within the body of the individual, the disadvantage or 
advantage because of that impairment is not located within the body of the 
individual, but instead in how society structures itself. Difficulty walking only 
becomes an obstacle when there is a step to surmount. A ramp would not pose 
the same difficulty. Like for disability, the markers for race and sex can be 
located within the individual, but they do not become a disadvantage or 
advantage until they interact with social structures.91 
The core concept here may just be another way to talk about a male norm 
or a white norm, but those concepts do not seem to have had a lot of traction 
with the courts or the general public. Maybe this is because, as the discipline of 
masculinities studies tells us, individual men do not feel powerful. And as 
critical race studies tell us about white privilege, it is difficult for all of us of 
 
 91. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 18 (2009). 
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any race, color, sex, or class, to see privileges we may have. Perhaps changing 
the terms we use will help us recalibrate our understanding of discrimination 
and make progress towards equality. Until we make some progress there, the 
law will not really be able to touch that glass ceiling. 
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